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Abstract
Deep neural networks have been shown to be fooled
rather easily using adversarial attack algorithms. Practi-
cal methods such as adversarial patches have been shown
to be extremely effective in causing misclassification. How-
ever, these patches are highlighted using standard network
interpretation algorithms, thus revealing the identity of the
adversary. We show that it is possible to create adversarial
patches which not only fool the prediction, but also change
what we interpret regarding the cause of the prediction.
Moreover, we introduce our attack as a controlled setting
to measure the accuracy of interpretation algorithms. We
show this using extensive experiments for Grad-CAM inter-
pretation that transfers to occluding patch interpretation as
well. We believe our algorithms can facilitate developing
more robust network interpretation tools that truly explain
the network’s underlying decision making process.
1. Introduction
Deep learning has achieved great results in many do-
mains including computer vision. However, it is still far
from being deployed in many real-world applications due
to reasons including:
(1) Explainable AI (XAI): Explaining the prediction of
deep neural networks is a challenging task because they
are complex models with large number of parameters. Re-
cently, XAI has become a trending research area in which
the goal is to develop reliable interpretation algorithms that
explain the underlying decision making process. Designing
such algorithms is a challenging task and considerable work
[28, 35, 26] has been done to describe local explanations -
explaining the model’s output for a given input [4].
(2) Adversarial examples: It has been shown that deep
neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples.
These carefully constructed samples are created by adding
imperceptible perturbations to the original input for chang-
ing the final decision of the network. This is important for
*Equal contribution
two reasons: (a) Such vulnerabilities could be used by ad-
versaries to fool AI algorithms when they are deployed in
real-world applications such as Internet of Things (IoT) [24]
or self-driving cars [29] (b) Studying these attacks can lead
to better understanding of how deep neural networks work
and also possibly better generalization.
In this paper, we design adversarial attack algorithms
that not only fool the network prediction but also fool the
network interpretation. Our main goal is to utilize such
attacks as a tool to investigate the reliability of network
interpretation algorithms. Moreover, since our attacks fool
the network interpretation, they can be seen as a potential
vulnerability in the applications that utilize network inter-
pretation to understand the cause of the prediction (e.g., in
health-care applications [8].)
Reliability of network interpretation: We are interested
in studying the reliability of the interpretation in highlight-
ing true cause of the prediction. To this end, we use the ad-
versarial patch method [5] to design a controlled adversar-
ial attack setting where the adversary changes the network
prediction by manipulating only a small region of the im-
age. Hence, we know that the cause of the wrong prediction
should be inside the patch. We show that it is possible to
optimize for an adversarial patch that attacks the prediction
without being highlighted by the interpretation algorithm as
the cause of the wrong prediction.
Grad-CAM [26] is one of the most well-known net-
work interpretation algorithms that performs well on san-
ity check among state-of-the-art interpretation algorithms
recently studied in [1]. Hence, we choose to study the cor-
rectness of Grad-CAM as a case study. Also, we show that
our results even though tuned for Grad-CAM, can transfer
directly to Occluding Patch [34] as another interpretation
algorithm.
As an example, in Figure 1, the original image (left) is
correctly classified as “French Bulldog”. On the top row,
a targeted adversarial patch has successfully changed the
prediction to “Soccer Ball”. Since the adversary is able to
manipulate only the pixels inside the patch, it is expected
that the interpretation algorithm (e.g, Grad-CAM) for
“Soccer Ball” category should highlight some patch pixels
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Figure 1: We show that Grad-CAM highlights the patch location in the image perturbed by regular targeted adversarial patches [5] (top
row). Our modified attack algorithm goes beyond fooling the final prediction by also fooling the Grad-CAM visualization. Here, Grad-
CAM is used to visualize the cause of the target category.
as the cause of the wrong prediction. This is shown in the
first row, top-right image. However, in the bottom row, our
adversarial patch algorithm, not only changes the prediction
to “Soccer Ball”, but also does it in a way that Grad-CAM
does not highlight the pixels inside the patch. We argue
that since the adversary can change only the patch pixels,
we know that the cause of the wrong prediction should be
inside the patch. So, the observation that Grad-CAM does
not highlight the patch pixels reveals that Grad-CAM is not
reliably highlighting the source of prediction. Note that in
this setting, the target category is not chosen by the model
and is randomly chosen by the adversary from all possible
wrong categories (i.e., uniformly from 999 categories of
ImageNet). We believe this shows that the Grad-CAM
algorithm is not necessarily showing the true cause of the
prediction.
We optimize the patch by adding a new term in the opti-
mization of adversarial patches that suppresses Grad-CAM
activation at the location of the patch while still encourag-
ing the wrong prediction (target category). We believe our
algorithms can be used as a form of evaluation for future
interpretation algorithms.
Practical implications: Our attack is more practical since
we are manipulating only a patch and hence is closer to
real world applications. As a practical example, some
applications in health-care are not only interested in the
prediction, but also understanding the cause of it (e.g., what
region of a medical image of a patient causes diagnosis
of cancer.) We believe our attacks can be generalized
beyond object classification to empower an adversary to
manipulate the reasoning about some medical diagnosis.
Such an attack can cause serious issues in health-care,
for instance by manipulating medical records to charge
insurance companies [11].
Our key contributions are summarized as follows:
(1) We introduce a novel algorithm to construct adver-
sarial patches which fool both the classifier and the inter-
pretation of the resulting category.
(2) With extensive experiments, we show that our
method (a) generalizes from Grad-CAM to Occluding Patch
[34], another interpretation method, (b) generalizes to un-
seen images (universal), (c) is able to fool GAIN [22], a
model specifically trained with supervision on interpreta-
tion, and (d) is able to make the interpretation uniform to
hide any signature of the attack.
(3) We use these attacks as a tool to assess the reliability
of Grad-CAM, a popular network interpretation algorithm.
This suggests that the community needs to develop more
robust interpretation algorithms possibly using our tool as
an evaluation method.
2. Related work
Adversarial examples: Adversarial examples were discov-
ered by Szegedy et al. [32] who showed that state-of-the-art
machine learning classifiers can be fooled comprehensively
by simple backpropagation algorithms. Goodfellow et al.
[13] improved this by Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
that needs only one iteration of optimization. The possibil-
ity of extending these examples to the real world was shown
in [20, 27] and [3] showed that adversarial examples could
be robust to affine transformations as well. Madry et al.
[23] proposed Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) which has
been shown to be the best first-order adversary for fooling
classifiers. Chen et al. [7] show that physical world adver-
sarial examples can be created for object detection networks
such as Faster R-CNN. Zaja˛c et al. [33] also showed that in-
stead of modifying the image, a frame can be placed around
the image to fool classifiers. Su et al. [31] showed that mod-
ifying one pixel using Differential Evolution (DE) is suffi-
cient to fool classifiers. Although there have been many
proposed defense algorithms, most of them have been over-
come by making changes to the attack algorithm as shown
in [6, 2]. Training robust networks is an important problem
that can lead to better understanding of neural networks and
also improve their generalization capabilities.
Adversarial patches: Adversarial patches [5, 18] were in-
troduced as a more practical version of adversarial attacks
where we restrict the spatial dimensions of the perturbation,
but remove the imperceptibility constraint. These patches
can be printed and ‘pasted’ on top of an image to mislead
classification networks. Recently, [30] showed that physical
adversarial examples and adversarial patches can be created
for object detection algorithms as well. We improve this by
ensuring that the patches fool network interpretation tools
that try to understand the reasoning for misclassification.
Interpretation of deep neural networks: As neural net-
works are getting closer towards deployment in real world
applications, it is important that their results are inter-
pretable. Doshi-Velez et al. [10] discuss the legal and so-
cietal implications of explainable AI and suggest that al-
though explainable systems might possibly be sub-optimal,
it is a necessity that needs to be considered under design.
This becomes extremely relevant when machine learning is
used in biology, where it is essential to ensure the model’s
decision-making process is reliable and is not due to an ar-
tifact of the data (See Discussion in [8]). So it is impor-
tant to make sure that the deep neural networks can be ex-
plained using robust and reliable interpretation algorithms
which can ensure transparency in the network’s explana-
tion. Researchers have proposed various algorithms in this
direction. One of the earliest attempt [28] calculates the
derivative of the network’s outputs w.r.t the input to com-
pute class specific saliency maps. Zhou et al. [34] calculates
the change in the network output when a small portion of the
image (11×11 pixels) is covered by a random occluder. We
call this Occluding Patch. CAM [35] used weighted aver-
age map for each image based on their activations. The most
popular one that we consider in this paper is called Grad-
CAM [26], a gradient based method which provides visual
explanations for any neural network architecture. Li et al.
[22] recently improved upon Grad-CAM using Guided at-
tention mechanism with state-of-the-art results on PASCAL
VOC 2012 segmentation task. Although the above methods
have shown great improvement in explaining the network’s
decision, our work highlights that it is important to ensure
that they are robust enough to adversaries as well.
Attacking network interpretation: Ghorbani et al. [12]
introduce adversarial perturbations that produce percep-
tively indistinguishable inputs that are assigned the same
predicted label, yet have very different interpretations.
However, in this setting, the adversarial image after pertur-
bation can have image regions which correspond to stronger
features for the same predicted label and as a result lead to
different interpretations by dominating the prediction score.
This is also noted in the discussion section in [12]. To mit-
igate this, we design a controlled setting using adversarial
patches where the adversary changes the network prediction
by manipulating only a small region of the image. Here, we
clearly know that the interpretation for the wrong predic-
tion should be inside the patch. Heo et al. [16] introduce a
threat model wherein the adversary can modify the model
parameters to fool the network interpretation. However, in
a practical setting, the adversary might not always be able
to modify the model parameters. Hence, we are interested
in modifying only the pixels in a small image area with-
out altering the model. Kindermans et al. [19] showed how
saliency methods are unreliable by adding a constant shift
to input data and checking against different saliency meth-
ods. Adebayo et al. [1] introduce sanity checks to evalu-
ate existing saliency methods and show that some of them
are independent of both the model and the data generating
process. We believe our method can serve as an additional
evaluation for future interpretation algorithms.
3. Method
We propose algorithms to learn adversarial patches
that when pasted on the input image, can change the
interpretation of the model’s prediction. We will focus
on Grad-CAM [26] in designing our algorithms and then,
show that our results generalize to other interpretation
algorithms as well.
Background on Grad-CAM visualization
Consider a deep network for image classification task,
e.g., VGG, and an image x0. We feed the image to the net-
work and get the final output y where yc is the logit or class-
score for the c’th class. To interpret the network’s decision
for category c, we want to generate heatmap Gc for a con-
volutional layer, e.g, conv5, which when up-sampled to the
size of input image, highlights the regions of the image that
have significant effect in producing higher values in yc. We
denote Akij as the activations of the k’th neuron at location
(i, j) of the chosen layer. Then, as in [26], we measure the
effect of each feature of the convolutional layer at the final
prediction by:
αck =
1
Z
∑
i
∑
j
∂yc
∂Akij
where Z is a normalizer. Then we calculate the interpre-
tation (heatmap) as the weighted sum of activations of the
convolutional layer discarding the negative values:
Gcij = max(0,
∑
k
αckA
k
ij)
We then normalize the heatmap: Gˆc :=
Gc
|Gc|1
Background on adversarial patches
Consider an input image x and a predefined constant bi-
nary mask m that is 1 on the location of the patch (top left
corner in the experiments of Figure 1) and 0 everywhere
else. We want to find an adversarial patch z that changes
the output of the network to category t when pasted on the
image, so we solve:
z = argmin
z
`ce(x (1−m) + z m; t)
where `ce(.; t) is the cross entropy loss for the target cat-
egory t and  is the element-wise product. Note that for
simplicity of the notation, we assume z has the same size as
x, but only the patch location is involved in the optimiza-
tion. This results in adversarial patches similar to [5].
3.1. Fooling interpretation with targeted patches
We now build upon the Grad-CAM method and adver-
sarial patches explained in the preceding section to design
our controlled setting that lets us study the reliability of net-
work interpretation algorithms. As shown in Figure 1, when
an an image is attacked by an adversarial patch, Grad-CAM
of the target category (wrong prediction) can be used to in-
vestigate the cause of the misclassification. It highlights the
patch very strongly revealing the cause of the attack. This
is expected as the adversary is restricted to perturbing only
the patch area and the patch is the cause of the final mis-
classification towards target category.
In order to hide the adversarial patch in the interpretation
of the final prediction, we add an additional term to our loss
function while optimizing the patch such that the heatmap
of the Grad-CAM interpretation at the patch location m is
suppressed. Hence, assuming the perturbed image
x˜ = x0  (1−m) + z m, we optimize:
argmin
z
[
`ce(x˜; t) + λ
∑
ij
(
Gˆt(x˜)m)] (1)
where t is the target category and λ is the hyper-parameter
to trade-off the effect of two loss terms. We choose the tar-
get label randomly across all classes excluding the original
prediction similar to “step rnd” method in [21].
To optimize the above loss function, we use an iterative
approach similar to projected gradient decent (PGD) algo-
rithm [23]. We initialize z randomly and iteratively update
it by: zn+1 = zn − ηSign( ∂`
∂z
) with learning rate η. At
each iteration, we project z to the feasible region by clip-
ping it to the dynamic range of image values.
We argue that if this method succeeds in fooling the
Grad-CAM to not highlight the adversarial patch location,
it means the Grad-CAM algorithm is not showing the true
cause of the attack since we know the attack is limited to
the patch location only.
3.2. Non-targeted patches
A similar approach can be used to develop a non-targeted
attack by maximizing the cross entropy loss of the correct
category. This can be considered a weaker form of attack
since the adversary has no control over the final category
which is predicted after adding the patch. In this case, our
optimization problem becomes:
argmin
z
[
max(0,M − `ce(x˜; c))
+ λ
∑
ij
(
Gˆa(x˜)m)] (2)
where c is the predicted category for the original image,
a = argmaxk y(k) is the top prediction at every iteration,
and y(k) is the logit for category k. Since cross entropy
loss is not upper-bounded, it can dominate the optimization,
so we use contrastive loss [14] to ignore cross entropy loss
when the probability of c is less than the chance level, thus
M = −log(p0) where p0 is the chance probability (e.g.,
0.001 for ImageNet). Note that the second term is using the
interpretation of the current top category a.
3.3. Targeted regular adversarial examples
We now consider regular adversarial examples (non-
patch) [32] where the `∞ norm of the perturbation is re-
stricted to a small , (e.g. 8/255) which fools both the net-
work prediction and the network interpretation. To this end,
in Eq. 1, we expand mask m to cover the whole image and
initialize z from x. For completeness, we report the results
of such attacks in our experiments, but as noted in the re-
lated work section, they do not necessarily show that the
interpretation method is wrong.
3.4. Universal targeted patches
Universal attack is a much stronger form of attack
wherein we train a patch that generalizes across images in
fooling towards a particular category. Such an attack shows
that it is possible to fool an unknown test image using a
patch learned using the training data. This is a more prac-
tical form of attack, since the adversary needs to train the
patch just once, which would be strong enough to fool mul-
tiple unseen test images. To do so, we optimize the sum-
mation of losses for all images in our training data using
mini-batch gradient descent for:
argmin
z
N∑
n=1
[
`ce(x˜n; t) + λ
∑
ij
(
Gˆt(x˜n)m
)]
(3)
4. Experiments
We perform our experiments in two different bench-
marks. We use VGG19 network with batch normalization,
Method Top-1 Acc(%) Non-Targeted Targeted
Acc (%) Energy Ratio (%) Acc (%) Target Acc (%) Energy Ratio(%)
Adversarial Patch [5] 74.24 0.06 50.87 0.02 99.98 76.26
Our Patch 74.24 0.05 2.61 2.95 77.88 6.80
Table 1: Comparison of heatmap energy within the 8% patch area for the adversarial patch [5] and our patch. We use an ImageNet
pretrained VGG19-BN model on 50,000 images of the validation set of ImageNet dataset. Accuracy denotes the fraction of images that
had the same final predicted label as the original image. Target Accuracy denotes the fraction of images where the final predicted label has
changed to the randomly chosen target label.
ResNet-34 and DenseNet-121 as standard network architec-
tures. We use ImageNet [9] ILSVRC2012 for these experi-
ments.
Then to evaluate our attack in a more challenging set-
ting, we use GAINext model from [22] which is based on
VGG19 (without batch normalization), but is specifically
trained with supervision on the network attention to provide
more accurate interpretation. We use PASCAL VOC-2012
dataset for these experiments since GAINext uses semantic
segmentation annotation and its pre-trained model is avail-
able only for this dataset.
4.1. Evaluation
We use standard classification accuracy to report the suc-
cess rate of the attack and use the following metrics to mea-
sure the success of fooling interpretation:
(a) Energy Ratio: We normalize the interpretation
heatmap to sum to one for each image, and then calculate
the ratio of the total energy of the interpretation at the patch
location to that of the whole image. We call this metric “En-
ergy Ratio”. It will be 0 if the patch is not highlighted at all
and 1 if the heatmap is completely concentrated inside the
patch. In the case of a uniform heatmap, the energy ratio
will be 8.2% (the relative area of the patch).
(b) Histogram Intersection: To compare two different
interpretations, we calculate the Grad-CAM heatmap of the
original image and the adversarial image, normalize each to
sum to one per image, and calculate the histogram intersec-
tion between them.
(c) Localization: We use the metric from the object
localization challenge of ImageNet competition. Similar
to the Grad-CAM paper, we draw a bounding box around
values larger than a threshold (0.15 as used in [26]), and
evaluate object localization by comparing the boxes to the
ground-truth bounding boxes.
We assume input images of size 224 × 224 and patches
of size 64 × 64 which occupy almost 8.2% of the image
area. We place the patch on the top-left corner of the image
for most experiments so that it does not overlap with the
main objects of interest. We use PyTorch [25] along with
NVIDIA Titan-X GPUs for all experiments.
4.2. Targeted adversarial patches
For the adversarial patch experiments described in the
method section, we use 50,000 images of the validation set
of ImageNet ILSVRC2012 [9]. We perform 750 iterations
of optimization with η = 0.005 and λ = 0.05. We use
the Energy Ratio metric for evaluation. The results in Ta-
ble 1 show that our patch has significantly less energy in
the patch area. However, this comes with some reduction
in the targeted attack accuracy which can be attributed to
the increased difficulty of the attack. Figure 2 shows the
qualitative results.
4.3. Non-targeted adversarial patches
Here, we perform the non-targeted adversarial patch at-
tack using 50,000 images of the validation set of Ima-
geNet [9] ILSVRC2012. We perform 750 iterations with
η = 0.005 and λ = 0.001. The results are shown in Table 1
and the qualitative results are included in the appendix.
4.4. Different networks and patch locations
Most of our experiments use models based on VGG19-
BN and also place the patch on the top left-corner of the
image. In this section, we evaluate our targeted adversarial
patch attack algorithm on ResNet-34 [15] and DenseNet-
121 [17] by placing the patch on the top-right corner of the
image. Similar to VGG experiments, both models are pre-
trained on ImageNet dataset. We use 5,000 random images
from the ImageNet validation set to evaluate these attacks
using the Energy Ratio metric which is presented in Table 2.
Our patch fools the interpretation while reaching the target
category in more than 90% of the images. The qualitative
results for these experiments are included in the appendix.
Method Targeted
Target Acc (%) Energy Ratio (%)
Adv. Patch (R-34) 100.0 61.9
Our Patch (R-34) 90.3 8.2
Adv. Patch (D-121) 99.9 71.3
Our Patch (D-121) 93.6 5.3
Table 2: Comparison of Grad-CAM heatmap energy within the 8%
patch area (placed at the top-right corner) for different networks
on 10% randomly sampled ImageNet validation images. R-34 and
D-121 refer to ResNet-34 and DenseNet-121 models respectively.
4.5. Uniform heatmap patches
One may argue that our attacks may not be effective in
practice to fool the manual investigation of the network out-
put since the lower (blue) heatmap of the Grad-CAM can
still be considered as a distinguishable signature (see Figure
2). We mitigate this concern by optimizing the patch to en-
courage higher values of Grad-CAM outside the patch area
(top-right corner instead of the patch area which is at the
top-left corner). Our results in Table 3 and Figure 3 show
that our attack can still fool the interpretation by generating
a more uniform pattern for the heatmap. We perform 1,000
iterations with η = 0.007 and λ = 0.75.
Method Target Acc (%) Energy Ratio (%)
Top-Left Top-Right
Adv. Patch [5] 100 76.96 1.65
Our Patch (Top-Left) 83.5 14.99 7.57
Table 3: Comparison of heatmap energy for the uniform patches.
We report the energy at both the top-left and top-right corners of
the heatmap.
4.6. Targeted regular adversarial examples
For the regular adversarial examples (non-patch) de-
scribed in Section 3.3 that fool both the network predic-
tion and interpretation, we perform 150 iterations with  =
8/255, η = 0.001, and λ = 0.05. Since the attack is not
constrained to a patch location, the Energy Ratio metric is
no longer applicable in this case. We use Localization Er-
ror and Histogram Intersection as the evaluation metrics in
Table 4. We compare with PGD attack [23] as a baseline.
The corresponding qualitative results are included in the ap-
pendix. Note that in this case, we run Grad-CAM for the
original predicted category.
Image Loc. Error(%) Histogram
Original 66.68 1.0
PGD Adv. 67.74 0.77
Grad-CAM Adv. 76.02 0.64
Table 4: Evaluation results for adversarial examples generated us-
ing our method and PGD [23] on 10% randomly sampled Im-
ageNet validation images. Note that for histogram intersection,
lower is better while for localization error, higher is better.
4.7. Targeted patch on guided attention models
To challenge our attack algorithms, we use the GAINext
model [22] which is based on VGG19 and is supervised
using semantic segmentation annotation to produce better
Grad-CAM results. The model is pre-trained on the train-
ing set of PASCAL VOC-2012, and we use the test set for
optimizing the attack. Since each image in the VOC dataset
can contain more than one category, we use the least likely
predicted category as the target category. We perform 750
iterations with η = 0.1 and λ = 10−5. The qualitative
results are shown in Figure 4 and the quantitative ones in
Table 5. Interestingly, our attack can fool this model even
though it is trained to provide better Grad-CAM results.
Method Target Acc (%) Energy Ratio (%)
Adv. Patch [5] 94.34 37.90
Our Patch 94.70 3.2
Table 5: Targeted adversarial patch attack on GAINext model [22]
4.8. Generalization beyond Grad-CAM
We show that our patches learned using Grad-CAM are
also hidden in the visualizations generated by Occluding
Patch [34] method, which is a different interpretation algo-
rithm. In occluding patch method, we visualize the change
in the final score of the model by sliding a small black box
on the image. Larger decrease in the score indicates that the
regions are more important and hence they contribute more
to the heatmap. The results of fooling GAINext model are
shown in Table 6 and Figure 5.
Method Targeted Attack Energy Ratio (%)
Adversarial Patch [5] 80.44
Our Patch 31.59
Table 6: Results showing transfer of our patch trained for Grad-
CAM and evaluated on Occluding Patch [34] visualization using
the GAINext model for VOC dataset.
4.9. Universal targeted patches
To show that the patch can generalize across images, we
learn a universal patch for a given category using the train-
ing data and evaluate it on the test data. We use GAINext
model along with η = 0.05 and λ = 0.09. The results
are shown in Figure 6 and Table 7. We learn 20 different
patches for each class of PASCAL VOC-2012 as the tar-
get category. We observe high fooling rates for both our
method and regular adversarial patch, but our method has
considerably low energy focused inside the patch area.
5. Conclusion
We introduce adversarial patches (small area, ~8%, with
unrestricted perturbations) which fool both the classifier
and the interpretation of the resulting category. Since
we know that the patch is the true cause of the wrong
prediction, a reliable interpretation algorithm should defi-
nitely highlight the patch region. We successfully design
an adversarial patch that does not get highlighted in the
interpretation and hence show that popular interpretation
algorithms are not highlighting the true cause of the
prediction. Moreover, we show that our attack works
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Figure 6: Universal targeted patch: Grad-CAM visualization results comparing our method vs Adv. Patch [5]. The top-1 predicted label
is written under each image and Grad-CAM is always computed for the target category. The target category chosen was “Aeroplane”.
Additional results are included in the appendix.
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Table 7: Results for the universal targeted patch attack using the GAINext [22] model on PASCAL VOC-2012 dataset using regular
adversarial patch [5] and our adversarial patch. We learn universal patches for each of the 20 classes as the target category.
in various settings: (1) generalizes from Grad-CAM to
Occluded Patch [34], another interpretation method, (2)
generalizes to unseen images (universal), (3) is able to fool
GAIN [22], a model specifically trained with supervision
on interpretation and (4) is able to make the interpretation
uniform to hide the signature of the attack. Our work
suggests that the community needs to develop more robust
interpretation algorithms.
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Figure 7: Targeted Patch Attack: Additional results for targeted patch attack for ImageNet pretrained VGG19-BN network similar to
Figure 2. Images come from ImageNet validation set. The last row shows a failure case where our patch is not completely hidden in the
interpretation.
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Figure 8: Non-targeted Patch Attack: Comparison of Grad-CAM results for non-targeted patch attacks using our method vs regular
adversarial patch. The description is in Section 4.3 and the quantitative results are in Table 1. We use ImageNet pre-trained VGG19-BN.
The predicted label is written under each image, the non-targeted attack was successful for all images, and Grad-CAM is always computed
for the predicted category. Images come from ImageNet validation set.
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Figure 9: Different networks and patch locations: Comparison of Grad-CAM visualization results for our targeted patch attack vs regular
adversarial patch. It uses ImageNet pretrained ResNet-34 network with the patch on the top right corner. The description is in Section 4.4
and the quantitative results are in Table 2. The predicted label is written under each image, the targeted attack was successful for all images
in this figure, and Grad-CAM is always computed for the target category. Images are from ImageNet validation set.
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Figure 10: Similar to Figure 9, but for DenseNet-121 network.
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Figure 11: Targeted regular adversarial examples: As described in Section 4.6, we use an ImageNet pretrained VGG 19-BN network
to perform a targeted attack using our method as well as using standard PGD method. Note that in this case, unlike other experiments,
we compare Grad-CAM for the original category and not the target one. The predicted label is written under each image. The attack was
successful for all images. Note that compared to the original image and the PGD adversarial image, the Grad-CAM for our adversarial
image fires less on the object. This attack not only reduces the probability of the original category, but also changes its interpretation.
Images are from ImageNet validation set. The quantitative results are in Table 4.
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Figure 12: Universal targeted patch attack: As described in Section 4.9, we compare Grad-CAM of our universal attack on GAINext
with the regular adversarial patch. The predicted label is written under each image, the targeted attack was successful for all images, and
Grad-CAM is always computed for the target category. Note that each row shows the result for a different category chosen as the universal
target. Images are from PASCAL VOC-2012 validation set. The quantitative results are in Table 7.
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Figure 13: Similar to Figure 12, but for different target categories. Interestingly, in the second row, regular adversarial patch is already
hidden in Grad-CAM although it is not optimized for.
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Figure 14: Similar to Figure 12 and 13, but for different target categories.
